10-07-202646
In today's globalized world, the standing of states is measured not only by geography, natural resources, or military capacity, but also by the perceptions formed about them — trust, transparency, and stability. International ratings and indices play a distinctive role in shaping these perceptions. Like a mirror of the modern world, they reflect the image of each country — sometimes in a favourable light, sometimes revealing its shortcomings.
* * *
International ratings and indices have become a significant information instrument shaping public opinion on states' political and legal development, the pace of reforms, and institutional capacity. One such source is the Rule of Law Index, produced by the World Justice Project (WJP). WJP describes itself as an independent, multi-disciplinary organization dedicated to advancing the rule of law globally; it traces its origins to 2006 as an initiative of the American Bar Association and has operated as an independent non-profit entity since 2009. According to the organization's official data, the 2025 index covers 143 countries and jurisdictions, is structured around 8 factors and 44 sub-factors, and draws on surveys of more than 215,000 respondents as well as the responses of over 4,100 legal practitioners and experts. The report should therefore be approached not as a superficial overview, but as a substantive analytical source.
According to the 2025 WJP report, Uzbekistan ranked 81st among 143 states and 8th among 15 countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia sub-region. Most significantly, at a time when rule of law scores have declined in 68 per cent of countries worldwide, Uzbekistan is recorded among the small number of states with an improving trajectory. The report further notes that the country ranked 17th globally and 1st in the region on the factor of Order and Security, 67th on Absence of Corruption, 73rd on Civil Justice, and 68th on Criminal Justice. Equally noteworthy is the report's observation that many states worldwide are experiencing pressure on the independence of the judiciary and a weakening of civil justice systems — trends that are not identified in the case of Uzbekistan.
At this point, it is essential to pose the central question accurately: the issue is not merely "where does Uzbekistan rank?" The more fundamental question is: "what political, social, and cultural reality lies behind that ranking?" For any index, however professional and rigorous its methodology, inevitably rests on a particular theoretical framework. WJP itself acknowledges in its methodology that the index does not measure the full picture of a country's situation, but rather specific dimensions of the rule of law through a defined set of factors. It is therefore more appropriate to treat such ratings not as definitive verdicts, but as important signals for analysis.
This approach is, in fact, consistent with the logic of the international agenda itself. The UN 2030 Agenda explicitly states that the Sustainable Development Goals are universal for all states, but that their implementation must take into account "different national realities, capacities and levels of development," and that respect for national policies and priorities must be maintained. In other words, the international community itself acknowledges the need to assess progress not through a single template, but in conjunction with national context, institutions, and the internal characteristics of each society. Accordingly, evaluating Uzbekistan exclusively through political and legal criteria formed in a Western context does not always yield a complete or objective picture.
This is particularly true with respect to criteria such as Open Government, Fundamental Rights, Civic Participation, Freedom of Opinion and Expression, and Freedom of Assembly and Association — the manifestations of which differ markedly across societies. In Western countries, civic participation finds expression primarily through non-governmental organizations, public demonstrations, independent media, and lobbying culture, whereas in Central Asian societies it is also realized through the mahalla (community-level self-governance body), family ties, neighbourly relations, collective deliberation, and social solidarity. Assessing all countries by a single set of politico-cultural criteria does not therefore always convey a complete and impartial picture.
The experience of foreign states equally demonstrates that a high ranking does not automatically signify an ideal situation. The European Commission's 2025 Rule of Law Report explicitly acknowledges that both positive and negative developments are present across all EU member states. The document records that alongside progress in the areas of the judiciary, anti-corruption measures, media pluralism and freedom, and the system of checks and balances between branches of power, unresolved problems persist. This in itself illustrates that a high rating does not equate to the absence of problems.
The French example illustrates this point more concretely. According to Eurostat data, in 2023 France was recorded among the EU member states with the highest prison overcrowding rate at 122.9, while Italy registered 119.1. This demonstrates that even in states whose legal institutions are widely regarded as advanced, serious challenges relating to the administration of sentences, conditions of detention, and humanitarian standards may persist. A higher position in the rankings does not always mean that all real-life problems have been resolved.
The situation in the United Kingdom leads to a similar conclusion. According to official statistics published by the UK Ministry of Justice in March 2026, as of end-December 2025 the outstanding caseload in the Crown Court — the jurisdiction handling serious criminal matters — had reached 80,203 cases. This represents the highest figure in the relevant observation series, with the median age of an outstanding case standing at 188 days and the number of cases open for more than one year reaching 21,002. These figures demonstrate that even in judicial systems with a strong international reputation, challenges relating to case backlog, delays, and timely access to justice remain pressing.
The United States example further illustrates the gap between ratings and real-life outcomes in the area of security and public order. According to official Federal Bureau of Investigation data for 2024, a violent crime is committed in the country on average every 25.9 seconds, and a murder is recorded on average every 31.1 minutes. This is not to suggest that the US legal system is deficient. It does, however, demonstrate that strong institutions and comparatively high international ratings do not automatically guarantee a high level of everyday security, even in advanced states.
Viewed from this perspective, one of Uzbekistan's most important strengths is its practical performance in the area of security and public order. The WJP report itself places the country 17th globally and 1st in the region on the Order and Security factor. This is not merely a statistical figure. It is a meaningful indicator that the country maintains a relatively stable environment in daily life, peaceful neighbourhoods, public order, and the effective discharge of the state's core security functions. Much international discourse centres on freedom and institutions; yet security is an indispensable condition of human dignity. An individual can fully exercise their rights only when a practically safe environment exists. In this sense, Uzbekistan's performance in this area merits serious study by many states.
Another significant strength of the New Uzbekistan experience is that reforms are beginning to manifest not merely on paper, but in the tangible reality of citizens' and entrepreneurs' lives. As of April 2026, the practical results of reforms aimed at streamlining public services, improving the business environment, and stimulating investment activity are becoming increasingly evident. According to data from the National Statistics Committee, as of 1 April 2026 Uzbekistan hosts 577,200 enterprises and organizations, of which 421,969 are entrepreneurial entities and 417,250 are small business entities. At present, the number of enterprises operating with foreign investment participation has reached 19,072, of which 4,392 are joint ventures and 14,680 are foreign enterprises. These figures demonstrate that reforms aimed at reducing administrative barriers, creating a conducive environment for entrepreneurship, and attracting external capital continue steadily in the New Uzbekistan in 2026 as well.
Another distinctive strength of Uzbekistan lies in its reliance on national forms of civic participation. The UN Common Country Analysis for Uzbekistan (2025) records the establishment of the Association of Mahallas of Uzbekistan, uniting more than 9,000 mahallas. The document emphasizes that in each mahalla a "Mahalla Seven" [«Mahalla yettilik» — a collegial body of seven community representatives] has been established, tasked with articulating community interests, strengthening cooperation, supporting local initiatives, advancing social justice and cohesion, and increasing public participation. This demonstrates that civic participation can be effectively ensured not solely through Western political formats of engagement, but also through the mahalla, neighbourly relations, and collective deliberation. This represents a distinctive harmony between national values and modern governance.
The transformations in the New Uzbekistan are further consolidated by practical results recognized by international organizations. In 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) declared that systematic child labour and systematic forced labour in Uzbekistan's cotton sector had been eliminated. ILO official materials recorded that 99 per cent of participants in the 2021 cotton harvest worked voluntarily, and that instances of forced labour across all provinces and districts had been reduced to negligible levels or were virtually absent. This is an exceptionally important finding: it signifies that the country's reforms have yielded results not merely as domestic political declarations, but have withstood the scrutiny of external monitoring and international audit.
The strengthening of the legal foundation also constitutes a significant component of the New Uzbekistan's reforms. The updated text of the Constitution of Uzbekistan explicitly establishes that human rights and freedoms are inalienable, that they cannot be restricted without a judicial decision, and — most fundamentally — that human rights and freedoms are directly applicable. Under this provision, the substance of laws, the activity of state and self-governance bodies, and the conduct of officials are all defined by these rights. This means that the rule of law is becoming in the country not a slogan pronounced for the sake of external image, but a constitutional principle. A gap between legal norms and lived reality invariably exists. Yet the creation of a legal foundation for narrowing that gap is an important factor that must be taken into account when assessing the outcomes of reforms.
At the same time, the WJP report identifies areas in Uzbekistan that still require further improvement. Lower positions are noted in directions such as Open Government and Fundamental Rights. However, the same report does not place Uzbekistan among countries where pressure on the independence of the judiciary from the executive is observed, or where weakening of the civil justice system has been recorded. The picture is therefore not one-sided: challenges exist alongside achievements. Objective analysis must take both dimensions into account simultaneously.
From this perspective, noting that certain criteria do not fully align with Uzbekistan's values and institutional traditions does not amount to a rejection of the rating, but rather constitutes a reading of it through the lens of national reality. In Western societies, the relationship between state and individual has been shaped along a particular historical trajectory. In Central Asia — and in Uzbekistan specifically — special importance is accorded to family, the mahalla, territorial solidarity, collective responsibility, and social stability. For this reason, a uniform Western framework does not always fully illuminate the full picture when assessing civic space, the forms of public participation, or the balance between state and society. The most constructive approach is to complement, rather than negate, international standards with national experience and institutional distinctiveness.
In conclusion, many countries across the world today are seeking a balance between tradition and modernization, freedom and stability, national statehood and global standards. The experience of the New Uzbekistan is significant as a model that is actively seeking and building this balance in practical terms. A number of its features — harmonizing security with public order, reducing the risks of bureaucracy and corruption through the digitalization of public services, developing a national mechanism of civic participation through the mahalla, implementing internationally recognized reforms in the sphere of labour, and strengthening constitutional guarantees — merit careful study at the international level. In this sense, it is more appropriate to regard the New Uzbekistan not merely as a figure in a ranking table, but as a functioning model of practical development. Particularly for states seeking to pursue modern reforms while preserving their national values, this experience represents not a ready-made template, but a highly instructive lesson and an approach deserving of serious consideration.
Jahongir Isayev, Head of Department, Centre for Sustainable Development